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Abstract 
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has developed several instruments delineating 
cooperation with third countries in the management of migration, borders and asylum in 
the so-called Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). Under the ‘more for 
more’ mechanism, the EU tries to persuade third countries to strengthen their border 
controls, restrict their visa policy and readmit irregular migrants with incentives such as 
trade benefits, visa facilitation or financial support. In its Partnership Framework of 
2016, the Commission announced a more pro-active approach by shifting its emphasis 
from the ‘more for more’ to the ‘less for less’ mechanism, including leverages and tools of 
all other policy areas. This article analyses the overall objectives of the GAMM (which 
are promoting fundamental rights and achieving an equal partnership) and the content of 
its four pillars. While elaborating on the potential impact on the policies in third 
countries and the human rights of migrants, it concludes that due to the paradoxical 
objectives, the cooperation has the potential to create counterproductive effects and an 
incoherent foreign policy. The absence of criteria on human rights for the selection of 
partner countries as well as the lack of a mechanism on monitoring or suspension of such 
cooperation lowers the chance of an adequate response in case of human rights 
violations. With these considerations in mind, the article explores the content and impact 
of the EU-Turkey deal and answers the question if it serves as a blueprint for a new 
generation of readmission agreements with other countries. The author concludes that 
due to the lack of mutual benefits and the differences in human rights standards and 
practices, transferring the responsibility of refugees to third countries will not prove 
effective and compliant with EU standards.  
 
Introduction 
During the last decades, the EU and its Member States have been struggling to ‘reap the 
benefits and address the challenges deriving from migration’, leading to a parallel 
development of internal and external migration policies.1 Apart from developing 
common EU standards on admission and residence of third country nationals, the EU 
established the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility in an attempt to create a 
comprehensive approach to migration by involving third countries and other policy 
areas. However, the increasing number of arrivals of refugees in 2015 has fuelled the 
discussion on the effectiveness of the fight against irregular migration and the role of 
																																								 																				
* Tineke Strik is an Associate Professor on Migration Law at the Radboud University, member of the 
Dutch Senate and member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as 
rapporteur on migration issues. 
1 European Union, European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A European Agenda 
on Migration, 13 May 2015, COM (2015) 240, at <ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf
> (accessed 19 November 2017). 
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third countries as an indispensable link in the chain. This rethinking has led to the ‘New 
Partnership Framework with Third countries’, in addition to the GAMM framework.2 
This article sheds light on the evolution and impact of the external dimension and how it 
contributes to a coherent and comprehensive EU migration policy. Based on experiences 
with the GAMM framework, it analyses whether the cooperation with third countries on 
migration benefits the EU, partner countries and migrants alike.   
 
I. Towards a Common European Asylum System 
The abolition of internal border controls reinforced the need for EU Member States to 
create a common policy on asylum and migration. With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
EU has gained competence on establishing binding rules on border controls and the entry 
of third country nationals, as well as their residence rights and return.3 The most visible 
strategy is the development of a European Common Asylum System, which includes 
standards on all stages of the asylum process: the asylum procedure, criteria for defining 
who is entitled to international protection, and which (social) rights are associated with 
the protection status. This harmonisation process was meant to prevent the need for 
secondary movements of asylum seekers within the EU, better known as ‘asylum 
shopping’. The previously concluded Dublin Convention, which determined that an 
asylum application is only examined by one Member State, proved not to be effective as 
long as the chances for asylum remained so different in each country.4 The EU standards 
go beyond the Member States’ international obligations towards asylum seekers and 
refugees. In particular, the very precise and detailed procedural guarantees for asylum 
seekers, such as an interview, legal aid, and well-trained staff, were not laid down before 
in Conventions or other binding instruments. The reception conditions offer an 
additional important safeguard for migrants and asylum seekers alike. The added value of 
the Qualification Directive when compared to the Refugee Convention and the European 
Convention on Human Rights is that beneficiaries of international protection are entitled 
to a residence permit and a (almost) uniform package of rights. Although the Common 
European Asylum System is relatively young (the first Directive was adopted in 2004), 
the need for gradual harmonisation has already led to many revisions. Mid-2016, the 
Commission proposed to replace the Procedures Directive and the Qualification 
Directive by regulations COM (2016)467 and COM(2016)466. The current political 
climate around refugees and migrants, however, makes it hard for EU Member States to 
agree on a uniform policy and practice as well as on internal rules on solidarity. Since the 
sudden increase in the number of refugees in 2015, the prevention and combat of 
irregular migration to the EU is one of the scarce areas where Member States find a 
common ground rather easily. This may have contributed to the increasing attention on 
ways to avoid that refugees and irregular migrants manage to cross the EU external 
borders.  
Parallel to the development of EU safeguards for asylum seekers and refugees, the 
																																								 																				
2 European Union, European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the European Council, the Council and the European Investment on establishing a new Partnership Framework 
with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, 7 June 2016, COM (2016) 385, at <eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016DC0385> (accessed 19 November 
2017). 
3  Article 62 and 63, European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (2012), C326/01.  
4 The Dublin Convention was concluded outside the EU framework and entered into force in 1997 (Pb C 
254, 19 August 1997). The first Dublin Regulation under the EU framework was Regulation 343/2003, 
the current one is Regulation 604/2013, but an amendment proposal is under negotiation. 
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EU also strengthened its policies in combating and preventing irregular migration. With 
that aim, it established a strict visa policy and a limited set of conditions for crossing the 
external borders of the EU and promoted the enforcement of this common border policy 
by strengthening the powers and means of Frontex. The EU has also involved private 
actors by sanctioning carriers for bringing in undocumented migrants into the EU and 
obliging Member States to sanction smuggling and supporting irregular residence.5 As the 
EU legislators have not recognised asylum as a ground for issuing a visa, the 
combination of all these measures has made it difficult if not impossible for refugees to 
travel to the European territory in a safe and regular way. As a result, their movements to 
a safe haven in Europe have become longer, more perilous and expensive, bearing in 
mind that fortressing has pushed up the price of smuggling. This parallel development 
leads to the cynical conclusion that the protection standards in the EU have reached a top 
level, but that they only apply to refugees who first had to risk their lives to reach and 
enter the territory of the EU. A main reason for this is that the EU standards do not apply 
at the embassies of the Member States, or anywhere outside the EU.6 
 
II. The Shaping of the External Migration Policy 
Besides these new legal instruments and enforcement strategies to reduce the number of 
irregular migrants, the EU is developing strategies to persuade countries outside the EU 
to cooperate in curbing irregular migration to the EU. If neighbouring countries could be 
convinced to strengthen their border controls with the EU, it would prevent refugees 
from invoking the rights they have on EU territory. This is why the cooperation with 
third countries initially had its focus on border controls and readmission agreements.   
 
A. Return to Home Countries 
The external dimension of migration policy is not an invention of the EU: since the 
nineties, a comprehensive cooperation has been developed by individual EU Member 
States with countries of transit and origin.7 They started negotiating readmission 
agreements with Central and Eastern European countries with a view to decreasing the 
immigration movements emerging at that time to the wider European region.8 
Readmission agreements set out that, upon application by the requesting state, without 
any further formalities than those specified in the agreement, the requested state must 
readmit any person who does not or no longer fulfils the entry or residence conditions 
applicable in the territory of the requesting state, on the condition that it can be proved or 
indicated by prima facie evidence that the person concerned is a national of the requested 
state. This implies that the sending state has first established the absence of a residence 
																																								 																				
5 Directive 2001/51/EC of the Council of the European Union of 28 June 2001 supplementing the 
provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ 
L187; Directive 2002/90/EC of the Council of the European Union of 28 November 2002 defining the 
facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ L328; See European Parliament, policy 
department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and 
the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants, 28 January 2016, at < 
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536490/IPOL_STU(2016)536490_EN.pdf> 
(accessed 21 November 2017).  
6 Article 3(2) of the Procedures Directive 2013/32 excludes the application on asylum requests made on 
representations of the EU Member States, Article 3 (1) of the Dublin Regulation only obliges Member 
States to examine asylum requests made at the border or in their territory. 
7 Roig, A and Huddleston, T, “EC readmission agreements: A Re-evaluation of the Political Impasse” 
9(3) European Journal of Migration and Law (2007) 363-387. 
8 Lavenex, S, Safe third countries: extending the EU asylum and immigration policies to Central and Eastern 
Europe (Central European University Press 1999), 76-82, 89. 
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right, thereby respecting its obligations deriving from international law, notably the 
Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but also 
from EU law. Expulsion is therefore only admissible after the person has had the 
possibility to exercise his right to appeal, in accordance with articles 13 ECHR and 47 of 
the Charter on Fundamental Rights.9  
Although countries have an obligation under international law to readmit their 
own citizens, it frequently occurs that a country of origin does not honour this 
obligation.10  A readmission agreement aims to facilitate and expedite this return and, 
although the agreements themselves are silent on compensation, they are often 
accompanied by incentives for countries of origin to sign and cooperate. These incentives 
can be related to other migration areas, such as visas (for study and business), but also to 
other policy fields, such as development aid or trade preferences. With the 
Europeanisation of migration policies, the Justice and Home Affairs Council started to 
explore the possibility for the EU to use beneficial agreements in fields under EU 
competition and to extract cooperation from third countries on controlling migration and 
readmitting migrants.11 Already before the EU had gained a formal competence on 
readmission with the Amsterdam Treaty (1999)12, the Council linked objectives in the 
field of asylum and migration to other policy fields by incorporating readmission clauses 
into Community and mixed agreements.13 Since 2000, partnership and cooperation 
agreements between the European Union and third countries, notably article 13 of the 
Cotonou Agreement, contain clauses, which demand that the parties readmit their own 
citizens.14 The Treaty of Lisbon allows the EU to integrate Justice and Home Affairs 
issues more systematically into its foreign policy.15 Readmission agreements negotiated 
under this Treaty have to be ratified by the European Parliament (Article 216). As they 
are not so-called ‘mixed agreements’, they consequently do not require separate 
ratification by member states’ governments or parliaments. However, after the 
conclusion, the readmission agreements are put at the disposal of and implemented by 
Member States.16 
While attributing the necessary competences in this field to the European level 
(shifting up), the Member States aimed to perform more powerfully in ‘shifting out’: 
																																								 																				
9  ECtHR, Gebremedhin v France, 25389/05, 26 April 2007. 
10 See Article 12.4 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Protocol No. 4 to 
the ECtHR, Article 3, para 2. 
11 Council of the European Union, PRES/93/202, 25 November 1993 and European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum 
Policies. COM (94) 23 final, 23 February 1994, para 114.  
12 This competence was derived from the term ‘repatriation’ in Article 63(3)(b) TEC, see Coleman (2009), 
74. 
13  Coleman, N, European Readmission Policy. Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2009) 22; Council Doc. 12509/95, 8 December 1995 and 4272/96, 22 January 1996. 
14 The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) 
countries was signed in 2000. Its Article 13 contains a standard readmission clause, which provides that 
every state party ‘shall accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the 
territory’ of another state party ‘at that State’s request and without further formalities’. This text also makes 
provision for the possibility of adopting ‘if deemed necessary by any of the Parties, arrangements for the 
readmission of third-country nationals and stateless persons’. 
15 The TFEU contains more explicit competences: Article 78(2)(g) provides a basis for concluding 
partnership and cooperation with third countries on asylum, Article 79(3) confers powers on the Union 
to conclude mobility partnerships and readmission agreements, taking shape in bilateral as well as 
multilateral cooperation. Article 8 TEU provides a general mandate to the EU to ‘develop a special 
relationship with neighbouring countries’. 
16 Article 63(3)(b), European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty of the European Union (2002) 
12002E/TXT. 
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through a ‘pooling of sovereignty’, the EU has a stronger negotiating leverage than the 
individual Member States.17 It allowed the Member States to make use of the 
Community’s external powers in fields such as trade and development and their 
substantial accompanying budgets to serve their interests in the field of readmission.18  
Under the ‘more for more’ principle, negotiations with third countries on migration 
control include various positive incentives for transit countries (for example, trade 
benefits, visa liberalisation and direct financial support) to let them strengthen their 
border controls, restrict their visa policy and readmit irregular migrants.19 Regarding 
countries of origin, the EU offers incentives not only to ensure actual returns, but also a 
decrease in the number of irregular departures to the EU through a variety of measures, 
such as improving the labour market or combatting smuggling and trafficking.  
 
B. Return to Transit Countries 
The most problematic issues deriving from the cooperation on readmission, however, do 
not concern the return of migrants to their home country; rather, they focus on 
readmission through a transit country which extended beyond the narrow meaning of 
repatriation as meant in Article 63(3)(b) of the Treaty of Amsterdam. EU Member States 
have increasingly shifted their focus to transit countries, especially to those sharing their 
borders with EU territory. The EU thus envisages creating a ‘buffer zone’ around its 
territory by committing its neighbouring countries to readmit migrants who have passed 
through them on their way to the European Union. Unlike countries of origin, a transit 
country does not have any legal obligation to readmit migrants simply because they have 
transited its territory, with or without permission. This is why the need for adequate 
compensation has gained importance. Not only the negotiations, but also the 
consequences of readmission agreements with transit countries turn out to be 
complicated. Considering that countries normally wish to readmit as few migrants as 
possible, the likely result is that those transit countries restrict their incoming and 
outgoing migration from neighbouring countries and to the European Union. This 
policy, which appears to be aimed at the prevention of applying a readmission 
agreement, is perhaps the actual result that finds most favour among the Member States. 
However, such implications also lead to at least three human rights concerns related to 
readmission agreements.  
Firstly, although the agreements will reduce the chances for migrants to invoke 
human rights in the EU, readmission agreements do not include any guarantee that the 
transit country has a sufficient protection regime in place for asylum seekers. EU 
Member States invest gradually more in the asylum systems of their neighbouring 
countries, but readmission itself does not depend on their performances in this area. EU 
officials are rather reluctant to negotiate with third countries on human rights in the 
context of readmission agreements since the EU is the requesting party. They prefer to 
introduce the issue of human rights in connection with negotiations on visa rules or other 
instruments, whereby the EU offers incentives for which they can claim human rights 
																																								 																				
17 Lahav, G, and Guiraudon, V, “Comparative perspectives on border control: away from the border and 
outside the state” in Andreas, P and Snyders, T, eds, The Wall around the West: State Borders and 
Immigration Controls in North America and Europe. Lanham (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2000), 55-
79. 
18 Coleman, N, European Readmission Policy. Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2009), 55; Noll, G, Negotiating Asylum: the EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common 
Market of Deflection, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2000), 206. 
19 See eg. the prominent references on migration and border controls “Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern 
Mediterranean Partners Report”, European Commission, doc. SWD (2015) 75 final, 25/03/15. 
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protection.20 Safeguarding human rights could therefore be facilitated by negotiations on 
different topics at the same time, including readmission.  
The second human rights implication relates to curtailing migration into transit 
countries from non-EU neighbouring states. This indirect effect of a readmission 
agreement may lead to migrants becoming stranded in a transit country with possibly 
fewer protection guarantees than offered by the partner country itself. With such 
countries, the EU may not have established any arrangement about access to an asylum 
system or rights of refugees. As an ultimate consequence, migrants may face obstacles in 
fleeing persecution or violence in their own country. Apart from protection concerns, this 
concern also shows that the chain effect can severely harm migrants’ and asylum seekers’ 
mobility opportunities, especially those from less wealthy countries. 
Third, a readmission agreement obliges a transit country to readmit an 
undocumented migrant from the EU. However, it does not grant the means to satisfy 
basic needs, such as the right to housing, health care, primary education, work or social 
welfare. Partner countries of the EU tend to conclude readmission agreements 
themselves with other transit countries with a view to immediately transfer the 
responsibility for migrants readmitted from the EU.21 This potential chain of transit poses 
a threat to the principle of human dignity as enshrined in international law, in particular 
if the migrant is unable to return to his home country.22 The latter is likely to be the case: 
if there were no obstacles to reach the country of origin, why would the EU Member 
State then have returned the migrant to a transit country? When I presented my report on 
readmission agreements to high officials of the Member States of the Council of Europe, 
the countries from the receiving side expressed their dissatisfaction with the readmission 
obligations and clarified that their country would not offer any rights or services to the 
readmitted migrants.23 This response reveals that the negotiators did not discuss or take 
into account the interests of the migrants subject to this cooperation since they did not 
coincide with the national interests the treaty parties defended in the first place. Bearing 
in mind the risk of a (legal) limbo situation occurring for the returnee in a transit country, 
the European Commission urged Member States to always give priority to returning 
undocumented migrants to their country of origin.24 It is not clear to what extent the 
Member States comply with this principle. They at least did not follow up the 
																																								 																				
20 Council of Europe, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, Strik, T, REPORT: 
Readmission agreements: a neutral mechanism or a threat to irregular migrants?, Doc. 12168, 16 March 2010, 
at <refworld.org/pdfid/4bdadc1c3.pdf> (accessed 19 November 2017). 
21 Centre for European Policy Studies, Balzacq, T, REPORT: The External Dimension of EU Justice and 
Home Affairs: Tools, Processes, Outcomes. Doc. 303, September 2008, at 
<citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.504.4430&rep=rep1&type=pdf> (accessed 19 
November 2017); Coleman, N, European Readmission Policy. Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009), paragraph 3.2.3.. For this reason, many readmission agreements 
include a clause that the obligations regarding non-citizens are only applicable after a number of years 
after the conclusion of the agreement. See Article 24 (3) of the readmission agreement between the EU 
and Turkey, OJ L 134/3, 7 May 2014. 
22 McCrudden, C, “Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights” 19(4) The European 
Journal of International Law (2008) 655-724. See the UDHR, preamble and Article 1, but more 
concretely related to social rights Article 22 and 23.  
23 Council of Europe, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, Strik, T, REPORT: 
Readmission agreements: a neutral mechanism or a threat to irregular migrants?, Doc. 12168, 16 March 2010, 
at <refworld.org/pdfid/4bdadc1c3.pdf> (accessed 19 November 2017). 
24 European Union, European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements, COM (2011)76, 23 February 2011, 
recommendation no. 8: “(…). In those cases (of readmission of third country nationals, TS) the EU should also 
explicitly state that, as a matter of principle, it will always first try to readmit a person to his/her country of origin. 
The EU should also focus more its readmission strategy towards important countries of origin.” 
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Commission’s advice to be reticent to include third country nationals in readmission 
agreements, given that the need for more incentives would complicate the negotiations 
substantially.25   
 
III. Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
Statistics on the number of returns enforced with the help of readmission agreements are 
hard to obtain because to the extent that states assemble and publish statistics, the 
number of returns is not broken down by the number of those enforced under the 
readmission agreements. However, the available evaluations show that the actual use of 
readmission agreements remains rather scarce, related to arduous and time-consuming 
implementation (for instance, lack of evidence is perceived as an obstacle), apart from 
lack of willingness of the contracting parties or individual migrants.26 Their mere 
existence, however, seems to serve as a catalyst for informal readmission practices, 
especially at the border.27 Despite this limited success, Member States perpetuate their 
approach of concluding readmission agreements as a main instrument of migration 
management and find an explanation for this practice in their preventive effects. The 
complications surrounding readmission agreements have fuelled Member States’ 
ambition to have more migration policy instruments at their disposal and offer incentives 
from other policy areas to gain actual cooperation from third countries. Numerous 
policy, legal and financial instruments have been developed, delineating cooperation with 
third countries in the management of migration, borders and asylum under the umbrella 
of a so-called ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (GAMM). Apart from 
readmission agreements, these instruments include visa facilitation agreements, mobility 
partnerships and common agendas on migration and mobility, high level dialogues, joint 
declarations and several financial frameworks.28 The Global Approach to Migration 
(GAM), established in 2005, aimed to address the root causes of migration and prioritise 
the rights of migrants instead of the security concerns of the Member States. In 2011, the 
EU inserted the term ‘Mobility’. GAMM serves as a framework for dialogue and 
cooperation with third countries in the field of migration and development. Its structure, 
meant to safeguard a coherent internal and external migration policy, is characterised by 
four pillars, which the Commission considers to be ‘equally important’.29 These pillars 
are: 1) Better organizing legal migration and fostering well-managed mobility, 2) 
Preventing and combating irregular migration, 3) Maximising the development impact of 
migration and 4) Promoting international protection and enhancing the external 
																																								 																				
25  European Union, European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements, COM (2011)76, 23 February 2011, 
recommendation no. 8: “The current approach should be revised. As a rule, future negotiating directives should 
not cover third country nationals, hence there would not be a need for important incentives. Only in cases where the 
country concerned, due to its geographical position relative to the EU (direct neighbours, some Mediterranean 
countries) and where exists a big potential risk of irregular migration transiting its territory to the EU, the TCN 
clause should be included and only when appropriate incentives are offered. (…)”. 
26 Coleman (2009) para 3.2.1; Strik (2010) para 24-26; Carrera (2016) chapter 4; European Union, 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements, COM (2011)76, 23 February 2011, para 2. 
27 Coleman, N, European Readmission Policy. Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers2009), 60, 319. 
28 CEPS, Carrera, S et al, The EU's response to the refugee crisis. Taking stock and setting policy priorities, 16 
December 2015, CEPS Essay No. 20, at <ceps.eu/publications/eu’s-response-refugee-crisis-taking-
stock-and-setting-policy-priorities> (accessed 19 November 2017). 
29 European Union, European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM (2011)743, 18 November 2011. 
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dimension of asylum. The pillars intersect on the following two principles: first, the 
notion of a mutual beneficial partnership with non-EU partner countries based on 
equality and, second, the principle that the GAMM should be migrant-centred, since ‘the 
migrant is at the core of the analysis and all action and that he must be empowered to 
gain access to safe mobility’. From this perspective, the human rights of migrants are 
marked as a cross-cutting issue, with the aim to strengthen ‘respect for fundamental rights 
and the human rights of migrants in source, transit and destination countries alike’.30 
These two principles emphasise the overall aim of the GAMM to create a win-win-win 
situation, with benefits for EU member states, partner countries, and migrants.  
One may question whether the notion of equality reflects the reality of the 
negotiating parties. On the one hand, the EU leverage represents a lot of power, which 
may lead to countries with a weaker bargaining position being ‘exploited’ by the 
returning countries. On the other hand, the Member States are the requesting party and 
are dependent on the cooperation of third parties, which creates opportunities for third 
countries to demand benefits. Their economic situation is one of determinants for their 
autonomy towards the EU. In any case, it is clear that the negotiating parties have 
different interests, which are not always easy to reconcile. In particular, the 
conditionality angle has raised the question of whether the dialogues truly offer ‘genuine 
and equal partnerships’.31 Where both negotiating parties at least have to find an 
agreement, the migrant as a third party is not present at the negotiation table. Their fate 
and rights depend on the responsibilities that the parties take. How does the EU manage 
to prevent or resolve tensions between those interests? The answer differs for each pillar. 
 
V. Organising and Facilitating Legal Migration and Mobility 
The M of ‘Mobility’ was added to connect the GAM with the EU visa policy for short 
stays and national policies concerning long stays.32 The aim of this pillar is to cover all 
forms of mobility and to ensure conditionality between visa facilitation (or exemption) 
and labour migration, on the one hand, and the partner country’s performance on 
asylum, border management and irregular migration, on the other hand. The functioning 
of visa facilitation as an incentive for third countries to cooperate in combatting irregular 
migration contradicts with its initial aim to regulate migration. It requires that Member 
States voluntarily give up their discretion on admission policies, since the issuance of 
short-term visas to migrants such as researchers, business people or students remains a 
matter of national sovereignty. The EU leverage, therefore, strongly depends on the 
‘levers’ or ‘carrots’ that Member States are prepared to offer to the countries concerned. 
However, most of them apply a restrictive visa policy and practice shows that they are 
not ready to subordinate their discretion to achieving effective EU agreements. As far as 
Member States show commitments, they are vaguely formulated or based on pre-existing 
programmes and initiatives. European Commission officials, therefore, complain that the 
success of Mobility Partnerships is severely constrained by the unwillingness of the 
																																								 																				
30 Strik, T. “The external dimension of EU migration policy and the functioning of the conditionality 
mechanism in partner countries”  Revista del Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social 130 (2017) 45-
71. 
31 Carrera, S, Den Hertog, L and Parkin, J, “The Peculiar Nature of EU Home Affairs Agencies in 
Migration Control: Beyond Accountability versus Autonomy?”15(4) European Journal of Migration and 
Law (2013) 23. 
32 European Union, European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Econimic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, dialogue for 
migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean countries, COM (2011) 292 final, 24 May 
2011. 
GroJIL 5(2) (2017), 310-328 
	
318 
Member States.33 If they do not perform, third countries cannot be expected to offer their 
loyal cooperation. Thus, the ‘shifting up’ strategy of the GAMM remains a theoretical 
exercise, as in reality the states retain their sovereignty and are far from keen to widen 
legal channels.   
Another constraining factor is that the EU mobility and migration policy 
primarily aims at meeting the evolving needs of the EU labour market. Legal migration 
opportunities are limited to highly skilled labour migrants,34 mostly in the context of 
temporary or circular migration. Cholewinski concludes that this Eurocentric utilitarian 
approach to migration management creates a contradiction between ‘rights’ and 
‘numbers’, where more open admission policies seem to inevitably result in fewer rights 
being protected.35 This tendency once again questions the intended equality between 
countries and also reveals the absence of a coherent approach to integration and 
migrants’ rights.  
 
VI. Preventing and Reducing Irregular Migration and trafficking in 
Human Beings 
The EU policy on fighting irregular immigration, strengthening border controls and 
ensuring readmission is the most developed pillar of the GAMM. As described before, a 
number of instruments of the Common European Asylum System, including carrier 
sanctions, Frontex (replaced in 2016 by the European Border and Coast Guard) and the 
digitalisation of border controls have resulted in a shifting European external border and 
exclusion mechanisms at several stages of immigration: from pre-departure to post-
arrival.36 The growing perception of irregular immigration as a security risk37 is reflected 
by the expanding access to migration-related data bases for the purpose of crime control 
and security. This development can further be observed in the increasing role of 
surveillance technologies and private security companies in European border policies, 
thus, contributing to the externalisation of EU border management. The most important 
factor, however, is the EU’s support of neighbouring countries in their border control and 
the fight against smuggling. Many scholars question the effectiveness of this enhanced 
border control, pointing to the risk that this creates new markets for smuggling. While 
perceiving migrants merely as a security risk, their agency, interests and rights tend to be 
overlooked. As migrants will try other avenues to reach their destination, smuggle 
trajectories will shift and, in many cases, become longer, more dangerous, and more 
expensive. Outsourcing enforcement on trafficking to Libya raises the danger of abuses of 
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migrants: in past years, international agencies and rights groups have documented the 
horrific treatment of migrants in detention in Libya, including torture, sexual abuse, and 
outright enslavement. Signals that Italy pays Libyan militias that were first engaged in 
smuggling and trafficking themselves to stop irregular migration will increase the risk that 
migrants end up in the hands of criminals. Furthermore, it empowers and enriches them, 
enabling the militia to buy more weapons and, more so, to undermine the fragile but 
internationally recognised authorities in Libya. Such business inevitably turns out to be 
counterproductive since it makes the EU vulnerable to blackmail and, thus, to pay an 
endless stream of money to prevent the smugglers from taking up their activities again. 
This is not the first time that Italy and Europe are engaged in doubtful arrangements to 
prevent smuggling:  until his death, Colonel Gaddafi struck deals with the Europeans for 
funding to crack down on trafficking. The migrant flow has, thus, long been a way for 
Libya to ensure aid and legitimacy from Europe.  
 
VII. Promoting International Protection and Enhancing the External 
Dimension of Asylum Policy  
This pillar is based on the assumption that enhanced protection in the region will reduce 
the (need for) forced migration to the EU. A comprehensive approach requires that 
investments in border control and sustainable protection are made simultaneously. After 
all, measures on border controls can have an immediate impact, while improvement of 
protection standards need long-term measures, such as capacity building, asylum 
legislation, and safeguards that refugees are not denied entrance. Paradoxically, 
evaluators conclude that human rights and reception are improved and supported on an 
ad hoc basis, whilst cooperation and funding of border controls is a structural matter.38 
The international community, including the EU and its Member States, is notorious for 
underperforming when it comes to funding the reception of refugees in their home 
regions. Organisations like the UNHCR assert that only a fraction of total funds required 
have ever been received and that humanitarian operations in the region are chronically 
underfunded.39 As long as the countries in the region are incapable of absorbing the 
overwhelming bulk of the refugee population (like Jordan and Lebanon in the case of 
Syrian refugees), asylum seekers will continue taking great risks to reach Europe.  
An absence of any issue-linkage would mean that migrants, including refugees, 
are stranded in a transit country without being able to turn to protecting authorities. 
Amnesty International reported that ‘the demands being placed on third countries to 
prevent irregular departures to Europe put refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants in those 
countries at risk of prolonged and arbitrary detention, refoulement, and ill-treatment’.40 
The focus on border controls in third countries may also impede the inflow of refugees 
coming from neighbouring countries who need temporary protection against suddenly 
escalating violence at home. The end to these life-saving short-term border crossings due 
to more rigid boundary regimes may be unintended; nevertheless, this undermines the 
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aimed enhancement of asylum protection. Without integrating the fight against irregular 
migration with enhancing regional protection, the GAMM itself may even contribute to 
protracted refugee situations.41  
This raises questions about the norms applied by the EU in its foreign policy 
concerning protection and human rights. One would expect that after having agreed on 
internal common standards, the EU would use these as a reference in their external 
negotiations on migration as well. However, their impact is far from clear. The majority 
of countries the European Union is pursuing partnerships with does not (yet) have 
systems for handling migrants and asylum seekers or even have a notorious human rights 
track record.42 Criteria for entering into cooperation on migration regarding protection 
standards are absent and so are human rights standards that a partner country is required 
to apply towards refugees and other migrants.43 This lack of standards also complicates 
the employment of independent and objective evaluation systems on questions of 
lawfulness and the guarantee of effective access to remedies in cases of alleged violations 
of fundamental rights.44 Furthermore, a suspension mechanism is lacking for situations 
where a transit country would fall short of crucial standards. Apart from the lack of 
conditionality on this issue, any other policy or strategy on how to sustainably strengthen 
human rights through cooperation on migration and how to reconcile a conflict of 
interests between human rights and border controls is failing.  
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants has 
criticised GAMM for: 
 
‘lack[ing] transparency and clarity in the substantive contents of its multiple and 
complex elements. Additionally, many agreements reached in the framework of 
the Approach have weak standing within international law and generally lack 
monitoring and accountability measures, which allow for power imbalances 
between countries and for the politics of the day to determine implementation. 
Nonetheless, the European Union has continued to use the Approach to promote 
greater 'security'. There are few signs that mobility partnerships have resulted in 
additional human rights or development benefits, as projects have unclear 
specifications and outcomes. The overall focus on security and the lack of policy 
coherence within the Approach as a whole creates a risk that any benefits arising 
from human rights and development projects will be overshadowed by the 
secondary effects of more security-focused policies.’45  
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VIII. Maximising the Development Impact of Migration and Mobility  
This pillar has the primary focus on the interests of partner countries and aims to ensure 
that countries of origin, rather than losing brains and capacities, will benefit from their 
citizens’ emigration. It would have offered an opportunity to compensate the partner 
countries and to create a genuine equal partnership, but the pillar includes the least 
binding measures, whose implementation is left to the Member States or respective EU 
funds. The permissive stance the EU takes in this regard reveals that it fails to truly 
recognise that only mutual beneficial agreements will prove effective. There are different 
perceptions of the manner in which emigration affects the economy of the countries of 
origin. Scholars and politicians mainly regard migration as a powerful motor for 
development, referring to migrants’ remittances to the home communities that outweigh 
the budget of development aid (often estimated as three times higher),46 diaspora’s 
involvement in the development of their countries of origin, and migrants’ return 
movements. Governments of developing countries, however, express their concerns 
about the persistent risk of ‘brain drain’, implicating that highly skilled people of a 
domestic economy are moving abroad.47 Achieving the objectives formulated under this 
pillar needs at minimum a common understanding of the current and aimed impact of 
migration, as well as a common sense of urgency. To grow mature, the pillar needs a 
binding and sustainable policy and a firm linkage with the first pillar on enhancing legal 
migration and mobility.  
  
IX. The GAMM: a Truly Comprehensive Approach? 
This brief analysis shows that in order to avoid incoherencies between the different 
GAMM objectives and programmes, their implementation needs a comprehensive 
approach. One of the advantages would be that it forces the EU to ensure coherence with 
its values and principles and, therefore, to address the human rights concerns as 
mentioned before. Apart from the right to asylum (Article 18) and the prohibition of non-
refoulement (Article 19), the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights also covers the right to 
human dignity in Article 1.  
There is, however, a broad consensus that the policy falls short of 
comprehensiveness. Scholars argue that the actual policy implementation of GAMM has 
been clearly biased in favour of the fight against irregular migration and ensuring of 
return migration by means of readmission agreements.48 The European Commission also 
acknowledges that ‘more work needs to be done to make sure that the Migration 
Partnerships are being implemented in a balanced manner, i.e. better reflecting all four 
thematic priorities of the GAMM, including more actions with regard to legal migration, 
human rights and refugee protection’.49 Theoretically, frameworks such as Mobility 
Partnerships are perfectly shaped to safeguard such a balance, including commitments by 
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all actors involved. As these commitments are rather abstract, the real balance depends 
on implementation. During my fieldwork for the Council of Europe, European officials 
admitted the current imbalance, clarifying that the EU is hesitant to impose conditions 
on human rights safeguards since it lacks the leverage to do so, even in multifaceted 
instruments. This can be explained by the EU’s adherent priority to border controls and 
readmission, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Member States’ reluctance to offer 
incentives in areas of their competences, such as visas.50 In these circumstances, the EU 
remains cautious in demanding certain human rights improvements, but also in 
criticising partner countries for alleged human rights violations, in order to sustain their 
cooperative attitude. Expressing severe criticism on human rights violations by partner 
countries would further expose the EU to allegations that it deliberately puts migrants at 
risk by continuing its cooperation. At the same time, we may conclude that hesitations by 
partner countries to agree on human rights safeguards actually confirm the need to 
negotiate with them.    
This broadly recognised imbalance in the current GAMM implementation poses a 
threat to the claim that partnerships on migration will produce win–win–win situations 
that will benefit the EU, partner states and the migrants themselves.51 The notion of a 
migrant-centred approach may easily be subject to divergent interpretation since it has 
not been clearly defined in the policy documents. There is already a considerable 
difference between the understanding of NGOs and the Commission. Where the 
Commission states that ‘a migrant-centred approach is about empowering migrants and 
ensuring their access to all relevant information about the opportunities provided by legal 
migration channels and the risks of irregular migration’, migrant and development NGOs 
stress the importance of incorporating the protection of migrants’ rights and their active 
participation in debates and decision-making.  
 
X. Partnership Agreements: Towards Less for Less 
Although these experiences create plenty of reasons for concerns and further analyses, 
the EU seems determined to continue the path of externalisation without thorough 
evaluation. The ‘European Agenda on Migration’ (EAM), formulated in light of 
Europe’s migration crisis in 2015, confirms the strengthening of the outward, external 
emphasis of the EU’s migration policy but is still based on the GAMM.52 The 
Commission seems to increasingly focus on the lack of cooperation by partner countries, 
having launched proposals to enhance their willingness to cooperate. This rather one-
sided approach contrasts with its evaluation of the readmission agreements of 2011, 
where it urged the Member States to review their policies and priorities.53  
The perception of partner countries as the ‘black sheep’ of the external dimension 
is reflected in the most recent initiative of the previously mentioned ‘New Partnership 
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Framework’ with third countries.54 This framework aims to adopt tailor-made ‘compacts’ 
with priority partner countries in which all instruments, tools and leverage are put 
together ‘to better manage migration in full respect of our humanitarian and human 
rights obligations’. Here, the principle of conditionality has been put at the centre of the 
policy, implying that the economic support for third countries depends on their 
performance on readmission and border control. The Commission considered a more 
proactive approach to third-country cooperation with a view to ‘stemming the flow of 
irregular migrants’ by not only offering a positive incentive for behaviour, but also by 
applying negative incentives. The ‘more for more’ principle would therefore be 
complemented with the ‘less for less’ principle and strengthened by the use of all EU 
policy areas, with the exception of humanitarian aid.55 The EU has put this approach to 
the test while negotiating with 16 priority countries on a country package.56 This 
framework is also built on the GAMM pillars; however, expressing that ‘a solution to the 
irregular and uncontrolled movement of people is a priority for the Union as a whole’. 
This explicit prioritisation is likely to further increase the potential tensions with the 
claimed equality of the four pillars, but also with the aim of a coherent and effective EU 
foreign policy if it leads to a subordination of all other policy objectives. The EU’s foreign 
policy has to serve a whole range of objectives, such as the promotion of peace and 
stability, economic growth, social upward mobility, and other development goals, such 
as combating poverty, illiteracy, and good governance, including human rights and the 
rule of law. Furthermore, the EU aims to foster its cooperation with third countries on 
other areas like trade, energy and environment. In the end, all these objectives serve the 
mutual interest of peace and welfare at the global level. They may not always be 
supportive to the objectives of EU’s migration policy, but have their own value and 
targets. Some of these objectives may even contradict the EU migration agenda, as 
development may initially lead to more mobility instead of stemming migration. On the 
other hand, withholding aid funding as a sanction on non-cooperation on border control 
will affect the poorest people and therefore the aim of combating poverty. Will the EU 
manage to combine the prioritisation to migration with safeguarding a coherent foreign 
policy, with regard to its divergent objectives as well as the impact of its external actions? 
And if not, at what cost will the EU push its migration objectives? 
 
XI. The EU-Turkey Deal: Blueprint for a New Generation of 
Readmission Agreements? 
Despite numerous developments and policies on external migration policy, the 
traditional readmission agreement still serves as a core instrument of the external 
dimension of EU migration policy. Through the years, the agreement has kept up with 
the times by changing character when it extended the target group from ‘own nationals’ 
to ‘third country nationals’ (from countries of origin to transit countries) and when the 
EU gained the competence to conclude agreements. The most recent development is the 
shift in the stage of readmission: instead of status determination prior to expulsion and 
only rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants being expelled, states now aim to 
shift out protection seekers to a transit country as early as possible in the procedure on 
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the basis of a ‘safe third country’ concept.57 With this move, EU Member States hand 
over the responsibility for determining the need for protection and (if needed) the 
granting of it. If this concept is applied, the asylum claim is only examined on its 
(in)admissibility, not on the substance by a Member State.  
The EU-Turkey statement of March 2016 is the first instrument, which has 
explicitly laid down this transfer, despite the many doubts if Turkey can be labelled as a 
safe third country due to its application of the geographical limitation of the Refugee 
Convention to Europe, its deficiencies in the asylum procedure, and the limited rights of 
recognised refugees.58 By taking away the guarantee that the person to be readmitted is 
not in need of protection, this shift has significantly raised the human rights concerns. 
The EU-Turkey statement nevertheless does not impose explicit requirements to improve 
its protection system, to grant the returnee access to an asylum procedure in accordance 
with international law, and to grant refugees all the rights enshrined in the Refugee 
Convention. The Statement promises that the returns of migrants from Greece to Turkey 
‘will take place in full accordance with EU and international law, thus, excluding any 
kind of collective expulsion. All migrants will be protected in accordance with the 
relevant international standards and in respect of the principle of non-refoulement.59 That 
the Turkish authorities do not necessarily share the interpretation of international 
standards by the EU was confirmed by judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights, convicting Turkey of violating Article 3 ECHR as well as many reports from 
authoritative human rights organisations.  
The ‘safe third country’ concept is laid down as an option in the EU Asylum 
Procedures Directive, but in the draft Asylum Procedures Regulation, which is currently 
under negotiation, the Commission has proposed it as an obligation for Member States.60 
At the same time, the proposal includes more flexible criteria for the definition of a safe 
third country and, for the conclusion, that the refugee has a genuine link with the third 
country.61 Although the Greek judges have showed their hesitance to apply the safe third 
country concept to Turkey (many asylum claims are examined on the merits and returns 
are postponed until the Greek Supreme Court has taken a final decision), the EU 
considers the EU-Turkey statement to be a success as it has stopped the mass arrivals on 
EU territory. It is telling that the EU is not motivated to seriously monitor the situation 
of asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey. Once again, the preventive effects seem more 
relevant than the actual returns.  
Since the number of departures from Libya has increased in previous years, the 
Member States are keen to adopt the same formula as agreed with Turkey in its relations 
with North African countries. Libya is known as a transit route for human trafficking and 
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contraband, but is also captured by complex political, territorial, social and tribal 
divisions. The EU has recently invested in capacity building and training of Libyan Coast 
Guards in order to prevent irregular departures from the Libyan territory to the European 
Union.62 The absence of a functioning legal framework or effective institutions makes 
cooperation and migration management considerably challenging and exposes migrants 
to great peril. It is widely recognised that migrants in Libya are currently extremely 
vulnerable to arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and even slavery and that they suffer from 
a lack of access to medical care and legal aid. 63 As a clear distinction between the 
authorities and the persecutors is failing, migrants intercepted at sea by the Libyan 
coastguard are not necessarily safe simply because of the risk of being returned to the ill 
treatment they managed to escape.  
The constraints on formal cooperation with Libya due to its poor human rights 
record have put pressure on its neighbouring countries. The Tunisian government, 
however, is reluctant to sign a readmission agreement as it perceives the acceptance of 
large numbers of third country nationals as a threat to its fragile democracy, which is 
already challenged by terrorism and poor economic prospects. The EU seems prepared to 
link its support for Tunisia’s fight against terrorism to a deal on migration control and 
readmission, thereby subordinating anti-terrorism and seriously disregarding the 
Tunisian government’s legitimate fears.64 In response to the Mobility Partnership with 
Tunisia, NGOs pointed at the lack of effective asylum legislation and adequate reception 
capacity, concluding that Tunisia does not qualify as ‘safe’.65  This conclusion applies in 
general to all North African countries. Notwithstanding the persistent human rights 
concerns towards refugees in Turkey, this country is still bound by more and higher 
standards in comparison to North African countries. As a member of the Council of 
Europe, it has to comply with the obligations of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, including Articles 3 (prohibition of torture and refoulement) and 13 (the right to 
an effective remedy). In the realm of the EU accession process, Turkey has agreed to 
align its legislation with the Common European Asylum System. Where Turkey already 
																																								 																				
62 Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/993 of 20 June 2016 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a 
European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED 
operation SOPHIA), OJ L 162/18, 21 June 2016. See also the European Union, “Malta Declaration by 
the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central 
Mediterranean route”, press release no. 43/17, 3 February 2017, at <reliefweb.int/report/libya/malta-
declaration-members-european-council-external-aspects-migration-addressing> (accessed 19 November 
2017). 
63 See UNHCR, “Libya: Refugees and migrants held captive by smugglers in deplorable conditions”, 17 
October 2017, at <http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2017/10/59e5c7a24/libya-refugees-migrants-held-
captive-smugglers-deplorable-conditions.html>; High Commissioner for Refugees Calls Slavery, Other 
Abuses in Libya ‘Abomination’ That Can No Longer Be Ignored, while Briefing Security Council”, 28 
November 2017, at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13094.doc.htm>; UN Supported Mission in 
Libya and UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Detained and Dehumanised’. Report on 
human rights abuses against migrants in Libya, 13 December 2016, at 
<ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf> (accessed 19 November 
2017); Médicins sans Frontiers, MSF Warns of Inhumane Detention Conditions in Libya as EU Discusses 
Migration, 2 February 2017, at <doctorswithoutborders.org/article/msf-warns-inhumane-detention-
conditions-libya-eu-discusses-migration> (accessed 19 November 2017). 
64 In its renewed action plan on a more effective return policy, the European Commission has identified 
Tunisia as a priority country to conclude a readmission agreement, see European Union, European 
Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on a more 
effective return policy in the European Union – a renewed action plan, COM(2017)200, 2 March 2017. 
65 FIDH et al, Tunisia-EU Mobility Partnership: marching towards the externalisation of borders, 17 March 2014, 
at <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/north-africa-middle-east/tunisia/14960-tunisia-eu-mobility-
partnership-marching-towards-the-externalisation-of> (accessed 19 November 2017). 
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has an asylum system in place, despite its deficiencies, Tunisia and Egypt have to build 
such a system from scratch, which is obviously not their top priority. Similarly, in its 
analysis of the EU–Morocco mobility partnership, the Euro-Mediterranean Human 
Rights Network (EMHRN) expressed its ‘fears that actions to combat irregular migration 
immigration will be prioritised and implemented at the expense of other themes included 
in the Partnership and, more worryingly, at the expense of the rights of migrants and 
refugees’.66 In a confidential European External Action Service (EEAS) document 
released by Statewatch, the service recognised that the situation of migrants and refugees 
(estimated to be one million) remains highly vulnerable and even pointed to the risk of 
more Egyptians being forced to migrate.67 EEAS further expressed that ‘important 
concerns about ensuring protection, livelihoods and access to services for refugees and 
migrants in Egypt, as well as ensuring the creation of fully-fledged asylum and migration 
management systems compliant with international conventions and human rights’ 
continue to persist.  
The experiences with the GAMM teaches that cooperation on migration tends to 
focus primarily on border controls, refugees may become stranded in transit countries 
without being able to find protection and safety there. Compliance with the European 
Convention and the Refugee Convention as well as sufficient support from the EU to 
uphold these standards should therefore be the minimal precondition for entering into 
cooperation on border controls. As third countries may also lack the willingness to 
comply with these standards in an attempt to avoid becoming responsible for more 
migrants, the EU should establish ways to monitor the human rights in place.  
Apart from these human rights concerns, enforcement of combatting irregular 
migration cannot be taken for granted in case of a lacking compensation policy. It is 
therefore crucial for the EU to take into account the enormous benefits from remittances 
sent home, following from legal but also irregular migration which can not easily be 
compensated with funding or trade benefits alone. Thus, in the absence of serious offers 
to create legal migration channels and as long as there is a market for irregular labour 
migrants, automatic compliance with the enforcement of combatting irregular migration 
cannot be taken for granted. Some governments, street-level bureaucrats or local 
authorities even draw direct benefits from organised irregular migration, especially if they 
are susceptible to corruption.68 A general prevalence of corruption and a lack of political 
will to control it often go hand in hand.69 These circumstances may discourage 
governments to cooperate on migration with the EU or otherwise encourage them 
towards non-compliance with agreed partnerships. Anti-corruption policy and a resilient 
rule of law system are necessary conditions also in avoiding the potential use of irregular 
migration as an incentive to ensure that the money keeps coming. 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
66 EMHRN, Analysis of the Mobility Partnership signed between the Kingdom of Morocco, the European Union and 
nine Member States on 7 June 2013, February 2014. 
67 Statewatch, European External Action Service "non-paper": how can we stop migration from Egypt? 30 
December 2016, at <statewatch.org/news/2016/dec/eu-eeas-egypt.htm> (accessed 21 November 
2017). 
68  OECD, Corruption and the smuggle of refugees, October 2015, at < oecd.org/corruption/Corruption-and-
the-smuggling-of-refugees.pdf> (accessed 21 November 2017). 
69  UNODC , Corruption and the smuggling of migrants, Vienna 2013, at < unodc.org/documents/human-
trafficking/2013/The_Role_Of_Corruption_in_the_Smuggling_of_Migrants_Issue_Paper_UNODC_20
13.pdf> (accessed 21 November 2017). 
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Conclusion 
The external dimension of EU migration policy is characterised by many ambiguities. 
The aim to embed policy in a comprehensive foreign policy does not match with the 
EU’s actual appreciation of migration as a top priority. In particular, the conditionality 
principle and the less-for-less regime impede the development of an independent 
balancing of the different interests at play. Within such a one-sided approach, other 
objectives of EU external policy such as regional stability and cooperation, rule of law, 
peace and security, and economic growth risk not coming into the picture. If programmes 
in these policy fields are made dependent on the fight against irregular migration, the EU 
also undermines the effectiveness of its own common foreign policy.70 The principle of 
equality and the aim to conclude mutually beneficial agreements also suffer from an 
emphasis on irregular migration. This relates to the weaknesses in the multi-level 
structure of the GAMM since the underperformance by the EU in the realm of positive 
incentives is due to its dependence on national decision-making. Considering that 
Member States have shifted competences to the EU in order to enhance their leverage, 
they should realise that such a transfer does not dismiss them from offering benefits in 
exchange for cooperation. After all, the external dimension is still a matter of mixed 
competences. Despite official commitments in agreements and partnerships, most of the 
implementation decisions depend on the national policy priorities and the national will 
regarding the level of funding or deploying personnel. If most Member States prefer to 
support return programmes instead of protection programmes, it is difficult to fully 
compensate this imbalance at the EU level. National politicians may be caught between a 
rock and a hard place: between the need to conclude effective deals and the pressure from 
the political arena not to give in on more legal migration. However, at both the EU and 
the national level, awareness is lacking of the fact that the external dimension can only 
become effective if all interests of the partner countries are taken seriously, including the 
reasons for their hesitation or reluctance. Furthermore, concluding deals with fragile and 
non-resilient states carries the risk of abuse or non-compliance since irregular migration 
to Europe may serve as part of a survival strategy.  
Even more difficult than concluding and implementing mutually beneficial 
agreements is to ensure that the interests of migrants are served as well. Their interests 
are obviously not prioritised by either of the negotiating parties, which is visible in their 
implementation practices. This is at odds with the principle of a migrants-centred 
GAMM, the equality of the four GAMM pillars and a coherent EU (human rights) 
policy. Even so, disregarding the interests of migrants also implies underestimating their 
agency, which is fatal for achieving an effective policy. If their rights and needs are not 
served, they will vote with their feet and find another way. Reducing irregular migration 
cannot be achieved by simply raising the pressure on transit countries. Even if they fund 
capacity building in these countries, Member States should be prepared to resettle a fair 
share of the number of stranded refugees. The current political deadlock on resettlement 
and relocation in Europe is far from promising. Instead, the development towards an 
obligatory application of safe third country concepts is likely to further narrow access to 
protection in Europe and to set the goals so high for the partner countries that they are 
bound to fail.    
																																								 																				
70 These aims are: - to safeguard the EU's values, fundamental interests, security, independence and 
integrity; -to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of 
international law; -to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security; -to assist 
populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters.  
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The present experiences with the GAMM system call for a serious reflection on 
how to avoid unintended or even opposite effects and how to better reach coherency and 
comprehensiveness as well as equality and compliance with human rights. As the 
principles attached to the policy have proven to be preconditions for its effectiveness, it is 
puzzling that the externalisation just charges ahead like a runaway train without 
seriously evaluating how to meet these principles in practice. The EU has no choice 
when it comes to taking due regard of the interests of all parties, even if it only were to 
pursue its own interests.   
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
www.grojil.org 
 
 
